Guantanamo\u27s Greatest Hits: The Semiotics of Sound and the Protection of Performer Rights under the Lanham Act by Tehranian, John
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 
Volume 16 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - Fall 2013 Article 2 
2013 
Guantanamo's Greatest Hits: The Semiotics of Sound and the 
Protection of Performer Rights under the Lanham Act 
John Tehranian 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Tehranian, Guantanamo's Greatest Hits: The Semiotics of Sound and the Protection of Performer 
Rights under the Lanham Act, 16 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 11 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol16/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Guantanamo's Greatest Hits: The
Semiotics of Sound and the Protection




As Bruce Springsteen and Ronald Reagan, Jackson Brown and
John McCain, and Tom Morello and Paul Ryan can attest, the
exploitation of creative works for political or commercial purposes that
run contrary to artists'ideals can stir passions and trigger lawsuits. Yet
for performers who are not authors of the exploited works, there is little
meaningful legal relief provided by the federal Copyright Act. Instead,
such performers-from featured singers and dancers to actors and other
personalities known for their distinctive traits-have leaned on
alternative theories for recovery, thereby raising the specter of liability
outside of copyright law for such unwelcome uses. While a rich body of
literature analyzes and critiques the use of publicity rights in these
contexts, the vindication of performer rights through the Lanham Act
and related state law has received far less attention. Furthermore,
though courts in such cases have frequently ruled in tandem on right of
publicity and trademark/false endorsement claims, jurists and scholars
have given insufficient independent analysis to the particularities of the
latter. This Article seeks to address this void by focusing on performers'
efforts to seek relief under the Lanham Act and related state law for
unwanted uses of their creative output in promotional contexts and by
considering alternatives for redressing performer concerns in a manner
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that better protects the public domain and balance in the intellectual
property regime.
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I. INTRODUCTION: BABY KISSES AND INFRINGEMENT MISSIVES
The US Presidential election cycle has its predictable, if not
comforting, quadrennial rhythm. Every four years, politicians vying for
the position of Commander-in-Chief descend upon Iowa and New
Hampshire, where they invoke comparisons to mythic figures of our
past, kiss babies, and shake the hands of ordinary citizens in an attempt
to connect with voters. In recent years however, another initiation rite
has become almost de rigueur for those making their way through the
nomination process: being accused of infringement. Indeed, over the
past decade, politicians have suffered a veritable tidal wave of legal
missives and lawsuits brought by artists who object to the use of their
creative works in political campaigns.' For every Fleetwood
Mac-which had no problem with having its hit "Don't Stop" associated
with the Clinton-Gore campaign of 19922-there are dozens of artists
who look askance at such exploitation of their music. During the 1984
election, Bruce Springsteen famously bristled at Ronald Reagan's use
of "Born in the U.S.A." and the seemingly oblivious invocation of its
lyrics as a patriotic paean.3 Ann and Nancy Wilson of Heart complained
1. See, e.g., Tamy Cozier, Campaign Trail Mix: A Brief History of Presidential Theme
Songs, PBS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wnetlneed-to-know/the-daily-need/campaign-trail-
mix-a-brief-history-of-presidential-theme-songs/13257; James C. McKinley Jr., G.O.P. Candidates
Are Told, Don't Use the Verses, It's Not Your Song, N.Y. Times (Feb. 3, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2 012/02/04/arts/music/romney-and-gingrich-pull-songs-after-complaints.html.
2. Justin Hughes, Election Copyright - They're Playing Our Song, MEDIA INST. (Apr. 14,
2009), http://www.mediainstitute.orgIPI/2009/041409_ElectionCopyright.php. It is worth noting
that the use forever sullied the song, even for those who were both fans of the ditty and the Clinton-
Gore ticket.
3. L.J. Jackson, Facing the Music, 97 A.B.A. J. 10 (2011).
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when 2008 Republican Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin roused
campaign crowds with the driving rhythms of "Barracuda."4 The Foo
Fighters took Republican Presidential candidate John McCain to task
for using their song 'My Hero," a "celebration of the common man and
his extraordinary potential," that was allegedly "pervert[ed]" by
McCain's use.5 Jackson Browne sued John McCain and the Ohio
Republican Party for using "Running on Empty" in a campaign
advertisement about energy policy. 6 And while it is not a musical work,
Shepard Fairey's iconic HOPE image, which was inspired by an
Associated Press photograph of Obama, spawned perhaps the most
famous litigation related to the 2008 campaign.
7
The recently completed 2012 campaign was no less riddled with
intellectual property controversies. During the course of the cycle, the
writer of Survivor's "Eye of the Tiger" sued Newt Gingrich for his use of
the song while stumping on the campaign trail.8 Tom Petty's attorneys
forced Michele Bachmann to cease and desist her use of "American Girl"
at rallies. 9 K'naan asked Mitt Romney to stop playing his song, "Wavin'
Flag."10 And most pointedly, Paul Ryan was pre-emptively warned not
to even consider publicly performing the music of one of his favorite
bands, Rage Against the Machine.11 Rage's guitarist Tom Morello, a
prominent social activist, made it clear that he did not reciprocate the
4. Allison Brennan, Campaigns Rock at Their Own Risk, CNN (Aug. 16, 2012, 6:43 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/16/politics/music-in-campaigns.
5. Dave Itzkoff, Rock Band Protests McCain's Use of Its Song, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/200S/10/09/arts/musidO9arts-ROCKBANDPROT_BRF.html (quoting
press release from the Foo Fighters).
6. Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The Browne case
settled before a decision on the merits, although the Lanham Act claim did survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. See id. at 1078-81; McKinley, supra note 1.
7. See Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues the A.P. Over Obama Image, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/arts/design/1Ofair.html.
8. See Complaint at 1, Rude Music, Inc. v. Newt 2012, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00640 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 30, 2012), 2012 WL 264219; see also Tamera Bennett, Complaint Against Newt Gingrich 2012
Copyright Infringement, JD SUPRA L. NEWS (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/post/
documentViewer.aspx?fid=dcd3739-c254-4801-aOd2-998059c0d7bb.
9. See Brennan, supra note 4; see also Andy Greene, Tom Petty to Michele Bachmann:
Quit Playing 'American Girl,' ROLLING STONE (June 28, 2011, 3:55 PM),
http://www.rollingstone.comlmusic/news/tom-petty-tells-michele-bachmann-to-stop-playing-
american-girl-20110628.
10. K'naan: Mitt Rommey Did Not Have Permission to Use "Wavin' Flag,' HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 1, 2012, 8:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/knaan-mitt-romney-did-
not n 1248731.html.
11. See Emmarie Huetteman, Rage Against the Machine Isn't Returning Ryan's Love,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/O8/17/rage-
against-the-machine-isnt-returning-ryans-love; Tom Morello, Tom Morello: 'Paul Ryan is the
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love when he swiftly disabused Ryan of any thought of playing Rage
songs at his rallies. 12 Not mincing words, Morello reflected:
Paul Ryan's love of Rage Against the Machine is amusing, because he is the embodiment
of the machine that our music has been raging against for two decades.... Don't mistake
me, I clearly see that Ryan has a whole lotta "rage" in him: A rage against women, a rage
against immigrants, a rage against workers, a rage against gays, a rage against the poor,
a rage against the environment. Basically the only thing he's not raging against is the
privileged elite he's groveling in front of for campaign contributions. 
1 3
The exploitation of creative works for political purposes clearly
stirs passions, and the claims of infringement have extended beyond
music. Peter Berg, the creator of the television series Friday Night
Lights, decried the Romney campaign's unauthorized use of the show's
memorable mantra: "Clear Eyes, Full Hearts, Can't Lose."14 Romney
had invoked the rallying cry during several speeches and also used the
phrase on his Facebook page. 15 In a letter, Berg accused Romney of
"plagiarism" and asserted that the "use of the expression falsely and
inappropriately associates Friday Night Lights with the Romney-Ryan
campaign. ' 16 In a parting shot, he exhorted Romney to "come up with
[his] own campaign slogan. '17
Yet for all of the vociferation, legal responses to musicians'
complaints have been mixed. Musicians' copyright claims typically fail
because the venues where politicians conduct their rallies possess
licenses from Performing Rights Organizations (PROs), such as
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) that enable the public performances
of the musical compositions. No matter how strenuously the artists
may protest, the copyright holder to the musical composition at issue
has invariably agreed to a blanket performance-license regime that
enables venues to play the musical composition without regard to who
is using the venue and for what purpose.18 That said, there are
12. See Huetteman, supra note 11; see also Morello, supra note 11.
13. Morello, supra note 11.
14. Matthew Belloni, 'Friday Night Lights' Creator Accuses Mitt Romney of Plagiarism in
Threatening Letter (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 12, 2012, 10:54 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/friday-night-lights-creator-accuses-378606. Not
everyone associated with the Friday Night Lights franchise disapproved of the use-Buzz
Bissinger, who wrote the original book upon which the movie and series were based, was a Romney
supporter. Id.
15. Id.




18. See, e.g., Music Performance Agreement, BMI, T 2, http://www.bmi.com/forms/
licensing/g1139m.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2013) (granting licensees "a non-exclusive license solely
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circumstances that can give rise to colorable legal action for copyright
infringement. For example, when a campaign captures footage of an
event where it plays a song and subsequently disseminates that footage
(by placing it on YouTube, for example), the campaign has engaged in
a use of the song that is not covered by public performance licenses. 19
Thus, use of a song in a political advertisement, as in the Browne u.
McCain litigation, violates the exclusive rights of reproduction and
distribution. Such uses are infringing absent an appropriate syncing
license. 2
0
For performers who are not holders of the copyright to either the
musical composition or sound recording, there is no available relief
under the Copyright Act. Typically, only the copyright holder of the
work being reproduced or distributed would have standing to bring suit
under the Act.21 For music, this is usually either the record label (which
usually retains the rights to the sound recording) or the composer of the
musical composition.22 This state of affairs has resulted in much
consternation. As the examples from the last several election cycles
demonstrate, featured performers often feel a sense of injury from the
unauthorized use of their creative works for unwanted political
purposes-so much so that they are sometimes willing to spend
significant amounts of their own money and time litigating these
cases. 23 And the injury felt by performers who are not copyright holders
to perform, present or cause the performance of, as part of Attractions in Facilities, including
recorded music performed in conjunction with Attractions before, after or during the
intermissions thereof, all the musical works as to which BMI shall have the right to grant public
performance licenses during the Term hereof.").
19. Since such a use results in a reproduction and distribution of the sound recording, the
copyright holder's exclusive rights to reproduce and publicly distribute the work are also
implicated. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2012).
20. Of course, liability does not ineluctably attach. Among other things, a court might
view such a violation as de minimis, see, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir.
2001) (stating, in dicta, that singing "Happy Birthday" at a restaurant might be deemed de
minimis unauthorized use of a [purportedly] copyrighted work and should therefore not incur
infringement liability), or excuse it on fair use grounds, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012); Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The right
to prosecute an accrued cause of action for infringement is also an incident of copyright
ownership.").
22. See, e.g., Complaint at 3-4, Rude Music, Inc. v. Newt 2012, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00640
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2012), 2012 WL 264219.
23. Litigation for principle's sake is frequently regarded as either extinct or a fool's
errand. It may sound naive to suggest, but it appears that there truly are some artists who pursue
these claims purely on the basis of principle and without regard to economic gain. See, e.g., Daniel
Kreps, Don Henley Settles Suit Against California Rep. Chuck DeVore, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 5,
2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/don-henley-settles-suit.against-
california-rep-chuck-devore-20100805 ("In a statement, Henley said, 'My colleagues and I brought
this lawsuit to protect our music from being taken and used, without permission, to promote
someone else's agenda. It was not a question of political ideology, but the right of artists to control
the use of the works they create, and protect their livelihoods."').
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is not limited to the world of music. Performance characteristics
subjected to litigation include the vocal (a singer with a gruff and raspy
masculine voice, for example 24) and physical (a blonde donning jewelry
and a gown turning large block letters25 or a stout middle-aged man
drinking beer while seated at the end of a bar,26 for example). In
addition, performers have objected to various forms of exploitation
beyond uses at campaign rallies and litigation on this issue has
extended to advertisements for products as diverse as political
candidates, 27 potato chips, 28 and cars.29
As performers have sought to vindicate their rights and litigants
have raised alternative theories for recovery, the specter of liability
grounded outside of copyright law has grown more pronounced. Unlike
copyright-infringement claims, these alternative theories usually
attach to the performer of the work rather than the holder of the
copyright in a given creative work.30 Most often, performers invoke
rights of publicity secured under state law. 31 For such claims, artists
must establish the commercial misappropriation of their voice, name,
or likeness (or in some states, the broader notion of a "persona").32
Litigants often bring a second claim concomitantly: the performer
typically asserts that the defendants' actions constitute a form of false
endorsement or trademark infringement under the Lanham Act or
related state law (usually grounded in unfair competition). 33 To create
a cognizable claim for legal relief under this theory, the plaintiff must
generally show that the defendant's use of the performer's distinctive
and distinguishing characteristics creates a likelihood of consumer
confusion that the performer is sponsoring or otherwise endorsing the
defendants' product.
34
24. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992).
25. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
26. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999).
27. See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
28. See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2001).
29. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2013).
31. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1.
32. See, e.g., id.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125; S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1274, 1275 (stating that "there is no essential difference between trade-mark infringement and
what is loosely called unfair competition").
34. See id. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Claims for false endorsement can be grounded in either
§ 1125(a)(1)(A), which generally provides a claim against false designations that are likely to cause
consumer confusion as to the source or origin of goods or services, including as to their sponsorship,
affiliation, connection, association, or approval, and § 1125(a)(1)(B), which generally forbids false
advertising. Typically, courts such as the Ninth Circuit have analyzed them as the former, thereby
requiring a likelihood of consumer confusion. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 813 (9th
Cir. 1997); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 16:1:11
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While there is already a rich body of literature analyzing and
critiquing the use of publicity rights in these contexts, 35 the vindication
of performer rights through the Lanham Act and related state law has
received far less attention. Furthermore, though courts in such cases
have frequently ruled in tandem on right of publicity and
trademark/false endorsement claims, both jurists and scholars have
given insufficient independent analysis to the particularities of the
latter.36  This is especially troubling because trademark/false
endorsement claims serve distinct purposes, 37  require distinct
elements,38 and enjoy distinct defenses. 39 This Article seeks to address
this void in the literature by focusing on the attempts of performers to
seek relief under the Lanham Act and related state law for the
unauthorized and unwanted uses of their creative output in
promotional contexts.
This Article begins by exploring why courts may feel an
intuitive, equitable impulse to respond favorably to such entreaties.
Using the example of music streaming at the American military base at
Guantanamo Bay, Part II assesses the potential injuries performers
might experience from the unauthorized exploitation of their work and
how they might seek legal relief for such objectionable uses. However,
Part III argues that the Lanham Act and related state law are an
uncomfortable fit for these types of injuries. Indeed, such machinations
by the courts have not served public policy well. 40  Specifically,
35. See, e.g., Zachary M. Vaughan, The Paradox That Wasn't: Federal Preemption of
State-Law Voice Misappropriation Claims, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 694 (2012);
Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First Amendment
and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165 (2010); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(2006); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 199, 221 (2002); Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity
"Wheel" Spun Out of Control, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 329 (1997).
36. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 35, at 220-21.
37. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 563 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946) (noting that the purpose of the Lanham Act is to "securea to the
business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from
those who have created them to those who have not"); Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-
Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 229 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("[The focus of [the Lanham Act] is on anti-
competitive conduct in a commercial context."); Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208,
215 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985) ('The central purpose of the trademark bill . . . was to "make possible a
choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other." (citing
S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946))).
38. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1i25(a)(1)(A) (2012) (interdicting, inter alia, false designations
of origin likely to cause consumer confusion in connection with any goods or services in interstate
commerce).
39. See, e.g., Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual
Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing the competing approaches
of courts to First Amendment defenses for, inter alia, right of publicity and trademark cases).
40. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
2013]
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inconsistencies as to what constitutes a protectable mark and whether
a likelihood of confusion occurs from the use of said mark have plagued
the case law, resulting in a series of decisions that take seemingly
paradoxical and troubling positions.41 Meanwhile, such rulings have
interfered with the functioning of the marketplace for creative works
and burdened the copyright regime as a whole, thereby threatening
commercial expectations in the licensing arena.42 And perhaps most
alarming of all, the recognition of performer rights through the Lanham
Act and related state law has potentially permanent adverse
consequences for the public domain and expressive freedoms. In the
end, while there may certainly be good reasons to push for greater
recognition of and protection for the rights of performers,
false endorsement claims through the Lanham Act and related state
law are not the appropriate vehicle for doing so. This Article therefore
concludes with some final thoughts about potential alternatives for
redressing performer concerns in a manner that better protects the
public domain and balance in the intellectual property regime.
II. MUSIC AS TORTURE? "BORN IN THE U.S.A." AND GUANTANAMO BAY
The impulse to provide remedies to performers for the unwanted
and unauthorized association of their works is certainly
understandable. After all, many performers spend a lifetime
cultivating their technique, delivery, voice, look, and other aspects of
their creative persona. Their performances often constitute intensely
personal forms of expression. As a result, the use of their creative
output in support of causes or products antithetical to their political
beliefs, moral standards, or aesthetic sensibilities can animate a very
real sense of wrongdoing. For example, consider how some recording
artists may feel about the federal government's use of their musical
performances at the Guantanamo Bay military base.43 As it turns out,
the base's repertoire is not intended for the enjoyment of military
personnel; rather, it is a carefully designed aural tool for use with the
prisoners. 44 Specifically, the soundtrack to Guantanamo Bay is replete
41. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
43. This discussion on the use of music at Guantanamo Bay is based on a previous
analysis I conducted on the topic. See JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0
AND YOU (2011).
44. See David Alexander, Performers Angry Their Music Used in Guantanamo
Interrogations, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/talesfromthetrail/2009/10/22/
performers-angry-their-music-used-in-guantanamo-interrogations
[Vol. 16:1:11
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with songs meant to addle and unnerve, especially on repeat. 45 But it
is a soundtrack to which the government may possess no rights of
performance.
46
Guantanamo Bay's Top Ten List-the songs most frequently
played to interrogate prisoners at the base-features a perverse
smorgasbord of heavy metal, noxious children's music, and (seemingly)
patriotic stadium rock:
1. "Enter Sandman" - Metallica
2. "Bodies" - Drowning Pool
3. "Shoot to Thrill" - AC/DC
4. "Hell's Bells" - AC/DC
5. "I Love You" (from the Barney and Friends children's
television show)
6. "Born In The U.S.A." - Bruce Springsteen
7. "We Are The Champions" - Queen
8. "Babylon" - David Gray
9. "White America" - Eminem
10. "Sesame Street" (theme from eponymous children's
television show)
47
45. The use of music as a form of psychological warfare is not entirely new. In 1989,
General Manuel Noriega, a reputed opera lover, see George J. Church et al., Panama No Place to
Run, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 38, was holed up in a Papal nunciature in Panama City, seeking refuge
with the Vatican after American forces had invaded Panama, see Panama's General Manuel
Noriega and His Fall From Grace, BBC (Dec. 11, 2011, 9:17 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
latin-america-15853540. In response, American military officials bombarded him incessantly with
loud rock and pop, including such songs as "Nowhere to Run" and "Smugglers Blues." See Roberto
Suro, Vatican Is Blaming U.S. for Impasse on Noriega's Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/30/world/after-noriega-vatican-is-blaming-us-for-impasse-on-
noriega-s-fate.html. In 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"') and
the FBI famously blared heavily distorted music and recordings of rabbits being slaughtered
during the infamous standoff with the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas. Michael Isikoff & Pierre
Thomas, Reno, FBI Took Fatal Gamble; Officials Believed Suicides Unlikely, WASH. POST, Apr. 21,
1993, at Al. The origins may go even further back. Retired United States Air Force Lieutenant
Colonel Dan Kuehl has located the Guantanamo policy's spiritual genesis in the Bible,
commenting: "Joshua's army used horns to strike fear into the hearts of the people of Jericho....
His men might not have been able to break down literal walls with their trumpets, but the noise
eroded the enemy's courage." Clive Stafford Smith, Welcome to 'the Disco,' GUARDIAN (June 18,
2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/19/usa.guantanamo.
46. Cahal Milmo, Pop Stars Demand Details of Guantanamo Music 'Torture,'
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/pop-stars-
demand-details-of-guantanamo-music-torture-1807255.html ("Campaigners say there is evidence
that music played repeatedly at ear-splitting levels was used to 'humiliate, terrify, punish,
disorient and deprive detainees of sleep' as part of efforts to break detainees during interrogation.
Former inmates at Guantanamo have previously testified that songs from AC/DC, Britney Spears,
the Bee Gees and Sesame Street were played as part of a psychological onslaught.").
47. Martyn McLaughlin, Rock Legends Want to Silence Guantanamo's Torture Tunes,
SCOTSMAN (Dec. 10, 2008, 9:17 PM), http://news.scotsman.comltopstories[Rock-legends-want-
to.4782083.jp.
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Politics aside, the government's use of music in Guantanamo
raises a key intellectual property issue: the military may not possess
the appropriate public performance licenses to play the music. 48 Artist
responses to this government use of copyrighted material without
permission have been mixed, however. For example, James Hetfield of
Metallica appears to condone the military's public performance of his
work in Fallujah, proclaiming that "[i]f the Iraqis aren't used to
freedom, then I'm glad to be part of their exposure. ' 49 Hetfield did
mention, however, that the government had neither asked his
permission nor paid him royalties. 50 Ironically, in other contexts,
Metallica has claimed that the unauthorized use of a copyright holder's
works constitutes an inexcusable act of thievery. 51 For example, the
band famously led the fight against unauthorized downloading of its
music on the Internet.
52
Not all artists have been so enthusiastic about the military's
unauthorized use of their musical compositions, however. As Trent
Reznor of Nine Inch Nails wrote: "It's difficult for me to imagine
anything more profoundly insulting, demeaning and enraging than
discovering music you've put your heart and soul into creating has been
used for purposes of torture."53 Reznor threatened legal action, but it
appears that he never followed up on this threat.54 Notably, in
contraposition to Hetfield, Reznor has served as a powerful voice
opposing the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
lawsuits against unauthorized Internet downloading.
55
Although a few individual artists have raised concerns about the
apparent infringement, the industry itself has remained relatively
silent. While the RIAA appeared to have no qualms about suing
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) grants copyright holders to musical compositions the
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly." Congress has defined "perform" as "not
only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing
is transmitted or communicated to the public." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 5676 (1976).
49. See Lane DeGregory, Iraq n" Roll, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 21, 2004),
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/21/Floridian/Iraq n__roll.shtml.
50. Id.
51. See Metallica v. Napster, Inc., No. C 00-4068 MHP, 2001 WL 777005, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2001).
52. See id.
53. Trent Reznor, Regarding NIN Music Used at Guantanamo Bay for Torture, NINE
INCH NAILS (Dec. 11, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://forum.nin.combb/read.php?9,302470.
54. See id. (wherein Reznor noted that "[i]f there are any legal options that can be
realistically taken they will be aggressively pursued, with any potential monetary gains donated
to human rights charities.").
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children and grandmothers for engaging in peer-to-peer file sharing,56
it did not seem as enthusiastic about pursuing infringement charges
against the federal government.57 Its reluctance to act in the face of
this potentially brazen unauthorized public performance suggests that
there may be more at play than legal issues.
Yet for performers who are not copyright holders of the sound
recordings or musical compositions being played, the situation is even
bleaker: an infringement suit under the Copyright Act is not even an
option, despite any injury that they may feel.5 8 Indeed, the absence of
relief for performers under the Copyright Act effectively grants the
federal government unfettered rights to cast musical performances in a
light that might be entirely at odds with the performers' wishes and
may entirely repurpose the semiotics 59 of the sound recording.
Consider Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the U.S.A."60  Its
unauthorized use at Guantanamo Bay allows the government to
re-engineer the meaning of the song almost entirely, transforming it
from an ironic and caustic appraisal of our societal failures to a bold
assertion of national pride and prowess. 61 Through its bleak portrait of
a Vietnam veteran forgotten by his own country, the song presents a
poignant critique of social inequalities and our tragic failure to properly
honor those who serve and sacrifice for their country.62 Played at
Guantanamo Bay, however, the song takes on an entirely different
56. See Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good Targets
for the Recording Industry, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 146 (2006) (documenting the music
industry's peer-to-peer litigation campaign).
57. See Smith, supra note 45.
58. In addition, moral rights are generally not recognized as a part of the American
copyright regime, as the latter seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of
the author. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
59. Broadly defined, semiotics constitutes the study of signs and their communication
and social signification. See UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 16 (1976).
60. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the U.S.A., on BORN IN THE U.S.A. (Colombia Records
1984).
61. See id.
62. See id. Containing the lyrics:
Come back home to the refinery
Hiring man says 'son if it was up to me'
Went down to see my V.A. man
He said 'son don't you understand now'...
Down in the shadow of penitentiary
Out by the gas fires of the refinery
I'm ten years burning down the road
Nowhere to run ain't got nowhere to go
Born in the U.S.A./I was born in the U.S.A.
Born in the U.S.A.
I'm a long gone daddy in the U.S.A.
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significance-at least to its intended audience of soldiers and
detainees. 63 With the imprimatur of DJ Uncle Sam, the song's
seemingly jingoistic, anthemic chorus takes center stage. Context
transforms the tune from a biting attack on the false promises of the
American dream into a patriotic paean that aurally demarcates the
insider-outsider (or American-non-terrorist versus non-American-
terrorist) divide separating soldiers and detainees. Indeed, a central
distinction between those detainees taken to Guantanamo Bay and held
indefinitely without charges and those brought to the United States and
entitled to full due-process rights was initially based on a detainee's
citizenship and birth status.64 If you were indeed lucky enough to be
born in the U.S.A., you were entitled to fundamentally different rights
than those who were not. 65 Thus, besides setting a patriotic tone and
asserting the base's status as a distinctly American space, the blaring
of the song over the Guantanamo loudspeakers also serves as a stark
reminder to the detainees of how much the fortunes of birth can affect
one's fate.
Admittedly, Bruce Springsteen, qua musical composer, probably
has a prima facie claim for copyright infringement against the federal
government for its activities (though bringing it might be a challenge
for various political and business reasons and the legal issues in the
case would not be without significant complexity).66 The government
63. Considering that some of the detainees may not speak English, one could argue that
the message targets the soldiers as much as the detainees.
64. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding, inter alia, that detainees
who are American citizens are entitled to challenge their detention before an impartial judge).
65. See id.
66. This issue is admittedly steeped in complexity. Although the federal government has
waived its sovereign immunity with respect to copyright-infringement claims, see 28 U.S.C. §
1498(b) (2012) (giving copyright holders the right to bring claims against the federal government
in the Court of Federal Claims for acts of copyright infringement), there is the question as to what
law (if any) might apply under this set of facts. It could be US copyright law, Cuban copyright law,
or even no law. The federal Copyright Act applies in any territory over which the United States
exerts sovereignty, see Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that '"Jnited States copyright law applies to what takes place in the United States,
[though] not to what takes place in Italy, Germany, or any other foreign place"). Still, to avoid any
issue of ambiguity, most United States territories have an express statute that enables application
of federal copyright laws. See Borge Varmer, Study No. 34 Copyright in Territories and Possessions
of the United States, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Comm. Print 1961) (noting how the US Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico, among other territories, have such enabling acts). Guantanamo Bay does
not appear to have such a provision in place. However, one can potentially circumvent this problem
in two ways. First, if a part of the infringing activity occurs in the United States (e.g., perhaps the
recordings are selected in the United States for unauthorized public performance in Guantanamo
Bay), parties in the United States who contributed to the infringing activity could be held liable
under American copyright law. MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4-17 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 17.02 ("[Iff, and to the extent, a part of an 'act' of infringement occurs within the United States,
[Vol. 16: 1:11
2013] G UANTANAMO'S GREATEST HITS
must arguably obtain a license to engage in the public performance of
his musical composition at Guantanamo or risk substantial damages
under the Copyright Act.
However, Bruce Springsteen qua performer is in a rather
different position. As the performer, he is irremediably associated with
the work (and its meaning). After all, people do not identify musical
works by their record company or musical composer; they refer to them
by the artist who performed the work, just as the above list featuring
Guantanamo's top-ten hits did. So when a work is used in a way that
injuriously re-engineers its meaning and the associations with it, the
performer feels it. Moreover, there is no doubt that a performer has
fueled whatever commercial and artistic value the work has achieved,
even if he did not author the copyright to the musical composition in
question.67 Despite these facts, the performer cannot bring a claim for
a violation of an exclusive right under section 106 of the Copyright
Act. 68 Instead, the artist must seek some alternate avenue for legal
redress. Performers in similar circumstances have done just that: sued
claiming, inter alia, false endorsement or unfair competition. While the
position of the performers is eminently reasonable and often
sympathetic, there is good reason to scrutinize judicial overtures that
provide them such relief.
then, although such act is completed in a foreign jurisdiction, those parties who contributed to the
act within the United States may be rendered liable under American copyright law." (citing, inter
alia, Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1094 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994) (en
banc))). Second, if one distinguishes Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008) (holding, in the
context of habeas rights, that the United States has exerted de facto sovereignty through its
"complete and uninterrupted" exercise of "absolute and indefinite" control over Guantanamo for
almost a century), by arguing that the terms of the lease for Guantanamo between Cuba and the
United States determine the issue, Cuba is the territorial sovereign of Guantanamo and
unauthorized performance would represent a violation of Cuban law. See Cuban Copyright Law
art. 4 (Act No. 14/1977), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=174839.
Given these facts, it is surprising that not a single one of the myriad rockers with a penchant for
all things Che Guevara has reveled at the prospect of suing the US government for infringement
under Cuban copyright law.
67. In the case of "Born In The U.S.A.," Bruce Springsteen did, in fact, author the musical
composition, as he regularly does with most of his recorded works. See Biography for Bruce
Springsteen, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0819803/bio (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
However, in many instances, iconic performances of a particular musical works are done by
celebrated artists who did not happen to author the underlying musical composition. See, e.g., JIMI
HENDRIX, All Along the Watchtower, on ELECTRIC LADYLAND (Reprise Records 1968) (written by
Bob Dylan); DON HENLEY, All She Wants to Do Is Dance, on BUILDING THE PERFECT BEAST (Geffen
Records 1984) (written by Danny Kortchmar); and ASTRUD GILBERTO, The Girl from Ipanema, on
GETz/GILBERTO (Verve Records 1964) (written by Antonio Carlos Jobim, Vinicius de Moraes and
Norman Gimbel).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (stating that the owner of the copyright has the exclusive
rights).
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III. THE PRIMROSE PATH TO THE LANHAM ACT: RETHINKING
VINDICATION OF PERFORMER RIGHTS UNDER THE THEORY OF FALSE
ENDORSEMENT
There are numerous concerns about the propriety of using the
Lanham Act and related state law as a vehicle for relief in such
performer-rights cases. As a starting point, consider just how imperfect
a fit the Act is for the rights truly being vindicated. As the text of the
Act makes clear, its purpose is to "mak[e] actionable the deceptive and
misleading use of marks in . . . commerce" and "to protect persons
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition. '" 69 To this end,
section 1125(a) provides a federal remedy against anyone engaged in
"[a] false designation of origin" or any "false or misleading
description ... or representation of fact" in connection with "any goods
services" in a manner likely to cause consumer confusion. 70 Although
courts have interpreted the Act broadly, 71 the Supreme Court has
cautioned that it not be read as a general law of unfair competition with
boundless application. 72 In attempting to raise a viable section 1125(a)
action to vindicate their performance-related rights, plaintiffs typically
claim that their case is about false endorsement and that consumers
would mistakenly think that the advertised product originates from, is
associated with or is endorsed by the plaintiff.7 3 In reality, however,
many of these suits represent (understandable but nevertheless
problematic) attempts to fit a square peg into the proverbial round hole.
The injury is not the confusion of consumers; rather, it is an
associational and semiotic harm. As Justin Hughes has argued, an
effort to control a song's meaning represents the real gravamen of such
claims.
74
Take Henley v. DeVore,75 a 2010 decision arising out of a dispute
between activist-musician Don Henley and conservative politician
Charles "Chuck" DeVore. 76 During the course of his 2010 campaign to
gain the Republican nomination and challenge Barbara Boxer for her
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
71. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776-85 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
72. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
74. See Hughes, supra note 2.
75. 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ('CThe Ninth Circuit has recognized a false
endorsement claim under the Lanham Act 'for the unauthorized imitation of [an individual's]
distinctive attributes, where those attributes amount to an unregistered commercial trademark."'
(quoting Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106 (9th Cir. 1992))). Disclaimer: the author of
this Article served as counsel in the Henley case.
76. Id. at 1147-48.
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United States Senate seat in California, DeVore produced two videos
that he uploaded to YouTube.77 The first video featured a song entitled
"The Hope of November," a sendup of Henley's nostalgic megahit "The
Boys of Summer."78  "The Hope of November" combined a karaoke
simulation of the instrumental track from "The Boys of Summer" with
new lyrics that critiqued Barack Obama, Nancy Pelosi, and their
supporters-such as Henley.7 9  In the process, the song played on
Henley's famous musings about the "Deadhead sticker on a Cadillac"
and the composition's apparent themes of disillusionment with the false
promises of 1960s activism.80 The second video featured a song entitled
"All She Wants to Do Is Tax," a takeoff on Henley's deceptively
lighthearted "All She Wants to Do Is Dance."81 "All She Wants to Do Is
Tax" combined an instrumental simulation of "All She Wants to Do Is
Dance" with lyrics critiquing liberal tax-and-spend policies.8 2 In the
process, the song played on the original composition's apparent theme
of blithe indifference and Band-Aid problem solving in the wake of
political turmoil.
8 3
Henley invoked both copyright and trademark law in his suit.84
Specifically, he sued for copyright infringement where he could-he was
a joint author of the musical composition for "Boys of Summer."
8 5
Where he did not have a copyright claim-the author and copyright
holder to "All She Wants to Do Is Dance" was veteran songwriter Danny
Kortchmar,8 6 not Henley-Henley pursued an alternative intellectual
property theory.8 7 He brought a federal claim for false endorsement
under the Lanham Act, arguing that DeVore's use of his music usurped
77. See id. at 1148-49.
78. Id. at 1147-48. "Boys of Summer" was co-written with Mike Campbell of Tom Petty
and the Heartbreakers fame. Id. at 1147.
79. See id. at 1148, 1156.
80. See id. at 1148, 1156-57.
81. See id. at 1148-49. Although most famously performed by Don Henley, "All She
Wants to Do Is Dance" was written by noted composer Danny Kortchmar. Id. at 1148.
82. See id. at 1149, 1158.
83. See id. at 1148, 1157-58. Henley explains that the song was inspired by the politically
charged climate of the time. See id. He revealed that the last verse of "The Boys of Summer" was
intended to "change things by protesting and making firebombs and growing [their] hair long and
wearing funny clothes." See Mikal Gilmore, Henley Interview 1987, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 5, 1987,
at 287. However, he ultimately believed that his song had a marginal impact. He maintained that
"after all [their] marching and shouting and screaming didn't work, [they] withdrew and became
yuppies." Id.
84. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
85. See id. at 1147.
86. Id. at 1148.
87. Id. at 1166-69.
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his protected persona and created a likelihood of consumer confusion
regarding his sponsorship of or affiliation with DeVore.88
But the Lanham Act claim was a poor proxy for the real injury
for which Henley effectively sought relief.8 9 At the core, Henley wanted
to prevent the use of his works in a manner that he found objectionable,
as a tool to besmirch political candidates he supported in order to raise
campaign awareness and funds for a political candidate he did not. 90
The injury to Henley was not that people confused the campaign spots
for his endorsement of the candidate. 91 After all, Henley's voice was not
even used in the video; rather, the vocals came from Justin Hart, the
DeVore campaign's Director of Internet Strategies and New Media. 92
And the Hart and Henley voices were virtually impossible for even the
most tin-eared listener to confuse. 93 As the court euphemistically noted,
Hart's voice was "less-than-angelic," particularly when compared to
Henley's "more soothing vocals. ' 94 Furthermore, Henley's motivation
was not primarily economic: he did not want to be paid a license fee for
the use of his work. 95 Indeed, Henley has foregone millions of dollars in
potential licensing revenue over the years by systematically refusing to
permit the use of his works in any advertisement or context he deems
88. Id. at 1167-69. Henley was a rare performer rights case that did not bring a right of
publicity claim. Id. at 1149. In all likelihood, Henley and his counsel made this decision
strategically, as a result of several factors unique to the case that disfavored such a tactic. First,
California's right of publicity statute, Civil Code section 3344, contains a specific exception for the
use of an individual's publicity rights in the context of a political campaign. See CAL. CIV. CODE §
3344(d) (West 2013). Second, under California's statutory and common law right of publicity law
(and unlike federal copyright law), transformative use constitutes a per se defense to claims of
infringement. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the use of names
and likenesses of musicians as half-worm, half-human creatures in a comic book was sufficiently
transformative to entitle the work to full First Amendment protection); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (holding that transformative but unauthorized
uses of the name, voice or likeness of individuals are protected under the First Amendment and
immunized from right of publicity liability). Finally, California has an anti-SLAPP statute to
which all state-law claims attach, including those brought in federal court under pendant
jurisdiction. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2013). The anti-SLAPP statute provides the
mandatory award of fees to defendants who prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 425.16(c).
89. This analysis and the points raised herein are based on a discussion with DeVore
counsel, Chris Arledge.
90. See Kreps, supra note 23.
91. See id.; Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
92. See Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
93. See id. at 1168.
94. Id.
95. See Ben Sheffner, Henley, Devore Settle Lawsuit; Henley Rails Against Remixes and
Mash-ups, You Tube, 'Dark Side' of Internet; Songs are Not 'Toys or Playthings,' COPYRIGHTS &
CAMPAIGNS (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:33 AM), http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2010/08/henley-
devore-settle-lawsuit-henley.html (quoting Sheffner's interview with Don Henley).
G UANTANAMO'S GREATEST HITS
commercial. 96 What Henley truly sought to vindicate was his right to
prevent the use of his work in such situations; he wanted to be able to
control the meaning of his work and the contexts in which it is
presented. 97 Use as parodic or satirical fodder for a right-wing political
candidate certainly did not make the cut. The real injury to Henley, if
there was one, was not the idea of consumer confusion as to sponsorship
or affiliation; it was the semiotic recasting of his songs into something
he never intended them to be.
Perhaps because of the imperfect fit, court decisions treating
performer rights raised under the aegis of the Lanham Act have been
incongruous and unpredictable, further calling attention to the
problematic nature of such theories. The inconsistencies typically stem
from judicial resolution of two primary elements needed to make out a
prima facie claim under the Lanham Act: (1) a showing that the plaintiff
possesses a protectable mark;9 and (2) a likelihood that the defendant's
activities making use of the same or similar mark create confusion
among consumers as to sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement. 99 In
both assessing the existence of a protectable mark and determining the
likelihood of consumer confusion, courts have embraced seemingly
paradoxical positions.
On the first matter, to prevail in a claim of false endorsement,
performers must point to some protectable, source-identifying mark
that they own.100 Courts must therefore wrestle with the issue of what
qualifies as a protectable mark.101 In answering this question, the case
law is both mixed and muddled. On one hand, courts have held that
"signature performances" are not, at present, protectable. Accordingly,
in Oliveria v. Frito-Lay, Inc., Astrud Gilberto could not seek Lanham
Act relief for the unauthorized use of her signature performance of "The
Girl from Ipanema" in an advertisement for Baked Lay's potato chips.'
0 2
96. See Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 ('The Defendants' primary argument is that there
is no market for licensed use of the works because the Plaintiffs refuse to license their works.").
97. See Sheffner, supra note 95 (characterizing the suit, in Henley's own words as "simply
a matter of my copyrights being violated by music being used in a way it was never intended to be
used").
98. See Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004); Packman v.
Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
99. See Donchez, 392 F.3d at 1215; Packman, 267 F.3d at 638; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
100. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[C]ourts have
recognized false endorsement claims brought by plaintiffs, including celebrities, for the
unauthorized imitation of their distinctive attributes, where those attributes amount to an
unregistered commercial 'trademark."') (citation omitted).
101. See, e.g., Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61-63 (2d Cir. 2001).
102. See id. The court did caution that "[wie cannot say it would be unthinkable for the
trademark law to accord to a performing artist a trademark or service mark in her signature
performance," but suggested that this was a matter best left to Congress, if it so chose to amend
the Lanham Act, not for the courts. See id. at 62-63.
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Significantly, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that,
"Gilberto has not cited a single precedent throughout the history of
trademark supporting the notion that a performing artist acquires a
trademark or service mark signifying herself in a recording of her own
famous performance."10 3  Similarly, Don Henley could not seek
Lanham-Act relief for the unauthorized use of the music from his songs
by a political candidate.
10 4
On the other hand, while signature performances are apparently
not capable of protection (no matter how distinctive or famous), certain
non-vocal actions apparently can be-such as a blonde donning a gown
and jewels while turning large game-show letters105  or burly
middle-aged gentlemen drinking beer at the end of bar.10 6 Thus, in
defining Vanna White's mark as her "persona" as a letter flipper,10 7 the
Ninth Circuit famously allowed the game show hostess to proceed to
trial on a trademark claim,108 which she brought against Samsung for
a satirical advertisement featuring a futuristic world where a
blonde-wigged robot would turn illuminated alphabetic cubes in her
stead.109 And in defining the relevant mark as composed of their
"unique physical characteristics" (while seated at the end of a bar,
presumably), 10 the Ninth Circuit allowed actors George Wendt and
John Ratzenberger to move forward to a jury with a false endorsement
claim for the use of animatronic robotic figures based on their Norm and
Cliff characters in a series of bars modeled after the set from the
television show Cheers.1  Interestingly, neither holding fully
addressed why, even if there were valid marks in the cases, those marks
should belong to Vanna White, George Wendt, and John Ratzenberger
103. Id. It should be noted that the court did vacate the dismissal of Gilberto's state law
claim for unfair competition. Id. at 64. However, the grounds for vacating the dismissal were based
on the district court's incorrect reading of the Complaint to admit that Gilberto had placed her
recording of the song in the public domain. Id. at 63. The court also vacated the dismissal of
Gilberto's state law claim for a right of publicity violation on the same basis. Id. at 64. As such,
there was no independent analysis given to the state law unfair competition claim as compared to
the right of publicity claim (or the Lanham Act claim).
104. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
105. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
106. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999).
107. White, 971 F.2d at 1400.
108. Id. at 1401. She also brought, and was allowed to proceed on, a common-law right of
publicity claim. See id. at 1399.
109. See id. at 1396, 1401.
110. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing appellants'
claim that "by using an imitation of their unique physical characteristics, Host misrepresented
their association with and endorsement of the Cheers bars concept").
111. Id. at 814. They also sued for violation of their statutory and common-law rights of
publicity. Id. at 809. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the defendants on the false endorsement claim. Id. at 809, 814.
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and not the rights holders of their respective television programs. The
courts also failed to explain what was so distinctive about a blonde
woman turning letters or a burly middle-aged man sitting at the end of
a bar drinking a beer.
Meanwhile, voices, but not signature performances, have
received protection so long as they are sufficiently famous and
distinctive. 112 Thus, Tom Waits could theoretically recover damages
under the Lanham Act when Doritos used a sound-alike in one of their
advertisements,1 1 3 and Bette Midler could recover (albeit under
California tort law) for similar actions by Ford.114 Such decisions are
particularly unusual since voices are largely functional and granting a
limited trademark monopoly in them potentially threatens a range of
expressive behavior. The use of an especially raspy singing voice in a
commercial, for example, becomes all the more dangerous in the wake
of the Waits ruling.11 5 Moreover, it is strange to consider that, while
Astrud Gilberto could not bring a Lanham Act claim for the actual use
of her voice,'1 6 Bette Midler and Tom Waits could bring similar claims
for imitations.11 7 Yet even on the imitation front, the case law is
inconsistent. The Ninth Circuit held that Nancy Sinatra could not seek
relief for the unauthorized imitation of her performance and vocal
styling in "These Boots Are Made for Walking" used in a Goodyear
advertisement.1 1 8 The same court, however, had no problem granting
such relief to Bette Midler and Tom Waits, 119 all while failing to
overrule or fully distinguish the Sinatra decision.1 20 All told, "signature
112. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988). Waits and Midler set up the requirement
that such protection only extends to voices that are sufficiently "distinctive" and "widely known."
See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099-1103 (upholding jury instructions to this effect).
113. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1112 (noting both that the jury could award damages under the
Lanham Act and that they were duplicative to the damages for voice misappropriation).
114. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64.
115. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096.
116. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2001).
117. Zachary Vaughan has discussed this paradox with respect to right of publicity
decisions seeking to vindicate performers' rights. See Vaughan, supra note 35, at 695, 710-15
(arguing that "this apparent paradox is actually no conflict at all").
118. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716-18 (9th Cir.
1970) (affirming summary judgment against Nancy Sinatra on her state law "passing-off' claim
where defendants used an imitation of her song).
119. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64; Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096. Of course, Waits granted such
relief on Lanham Act grounds as well as California common law while Midler granted relief on the
former but never considered the latter since the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to amend her
complaint to include a Lanham Act claim. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110, n.10 (describing the
procedural history of Midler).
120. The Waits court does discuss the Sinatra case briefly in the context of a string cite,
and claims in the parenthetical that the Sinatra court found that Nancy's voice was not
"sufficiently unique to be protectable." Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107. Yet it does not appear that the
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vocal performances" do not receive protection under the Lanham Act,
but non-vocal actions and voices sometimes can-both under Lanham
Act and state common law claims.
The courts' analyses in likelihood-of-confusion
determinations-a standard that bridges Lanham Act and state
law claims 121-have been similarly difficult to decipher. Courts have
allowed the likes of Vanna White, George Wendt, and Tom Waits to
prevail on false endorsement claims for the unauthorized use of their
persona or vocal stylings but have rejected the viability of such relief in
other cases. 122 Courts have reasoned that even if the plaintiffs
performance establishes a protectable mark, they must deny relief
because there is no reasonable basis to conclude a likelihood of
consumer confusion. 123 Again, a principled basis to distinguish differing
case outcomes is not readily forthcoming. For example, in Storball v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, Fox used The Capitols' ditty "Cool
Jerk" in two movies-Home Alone 2 and Night and the City-and
related advertising.124 Fox had presumably obtained the appropriate
copyright licenses for the use, so the plaintiffs were left only with a suit
for false endorsement, claiming that Fox's use created a
"misrepresentation of The Capitol[s'] affiliation with and endorsement
Sinatra court made any such finding. In fact, the Sinatra decision notes that: "In this case
appellant's complaint is not that her sound is uniquely personal; it is that the sound in connection
with the music, lyrics and arrangement, which made her the subject of popular identification,
ought to be protected." Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, at the time
of their respective lawsuits, Nancy Sinatra and her works were every bit as famous as (perhaps
more than) Tom Waits and his works. See About, NANCY SINATRA, http://nancysinatra.comabout.
html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). Furthermore, the Waits court never clarified just what is needed
to make vocal styling sufficiently distinctive to be given protection and why Sinatra's performance
did not rise to that level of sufficient distinctiveness. The Midler court, by contrast, distinguishes
Sinatra on the grounds that Sinatra sought to protect the particular song and arrangement-
creatures of copyright protection-whereas Midler sought to protect just her voice-something
outside of the scope of authorship and beyond the subject matter of copyright. Midler, 849 F.2d at
462. However, this does not explain why the Sinatra court did not recognize Sinatra's voice, by
itself, as sufficiently distinctive and widely known to qualify for protection. It is also worth noting
that, in the Sinatra case, the court explicitly wrestled with the issue of whether recognition of a
false endorsement claim would effectively impinge on the functioning of the federal copyright
regime. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717-18. It concluded that it would. Id. Neither the Waits nor Midler
decisions gave any weight to such an argument.
121. See, e.g., Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 173 (D.D.C.
1992).
122. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 173 (applying the reasonable jury standard in
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment); Storball v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., No. CV 93-2745 RMT (Tx), 1993 WL 734117, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1993) ("[N]o reasonable
jury could find such use of the sound recording to be sufficient to support the finding of confusion
or likelihood of confusion. As a result, defendant Fox is entitled to summary judgment on the
Lanham Act claims.").
124. Storball, 1993 WL 734117, at *1.
G UANTANAMO'S GREATEST HITS
of defendant's goods." 125  The court summarily rejected the claim,
stating in broad terms that the "[miere use of a sound recording in a
motion picture of audiovisual presentation, with truthful attribution of
the performance to the performers in the credits, does not constitute a
representation that the performers in the sound recording approve,
sponsor, or endorse the motion picture."
126
Musician James Brown also lost a similar suit against
Twentieth Century Fox when the movie The Commitments featured his
famous performance of the song "Please, Please, Please" from the
T.A.M.I. show in 1965.127 In a key scene in the movie, Jimmy, the leader
of the eponymous band, tries to inspire his mates towards more
dynamic musicianship by showing them the clip of Brown. 128 The
defendants had obtained a license from the copyright holders to the
T.A.M.I. show recording for use of the footage. 129 They also obtained a
license from the copyright holder of the musical composition and lyrics
for the use.130 Nevertheless, Brown believed the filmmakers also
needed his permission for the use of the footage, especially for its
exploitation in the marketing of the film, and he sued for false
endorsement under the Lanham Act. 131 The court dispensed with the
Lanham Act claim on summary judgment with a single line: " [T] here is
no evidence whatsoever that any viewers of The Commitments believed
that plaintiff had endorsed the film or personally approved the use of
the clip, nor could any reasonable jury reach that conclusion from
watching the film."
132
Yet courts in the Wendt, White, and Waits cases had no problem
finding that a likelihood of confusion could have resulted from satirical
(in the case of White)133 or imitative (in the cases of Wendt and Waits)134
125. Id.
126. Id.; see also, e.g., Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341,
350-51 (E.D. Penn. 1993) (finding that plaintiff failed to establish "that Disney represented that
[plaintiff] endorsed the home video" and "failed to prove that Disney violated the Lanham Act by
releasing home videos which correctly credited the [plaintiff] for the performance"),
127. Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 173.
128. See id. at 168.
129. Id. at 172.
130. Id. at 169.
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id.
133. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir 1992) ("Looking
at the series of advertisements as a whole, a jury could reasonably conclude that beneath the
surface humor of the series lay an intent to persuade consumers that celebrity Vanna White ...
was endorsing Samsung products.").
134. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
"[a] reasonable jury could conclude that ... Host's alleged conduct creates at least the likelihood
of consumer confusion," and "[s]ufficient evidence exists by which a reasonable jury might infer
actual consumer confusion"); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
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uses of performance personas. If anything, the logic might go the other
way. Presumably, an ordinary person is far less likely to understand a
commercial's satirical use of a blonde, letter-turning robot as having
White's sponsorship, approval, or endorsement than actual footage of
White in the same advertisement. As for imitations, at least they are
just that; the better the imitation, one would think, the closer it comes
to being as bad as a use of the original without permission. But it is
difficult to imagine how use of an imitation without permission is
actually worse than use of the original itself, especially from the
likelihood-of-confusion perspective. One could attempt to reconcile
these various holdings by arguing that the imitation cases involved the
use of physical characteristics (Wendt) or vocal stylings (Waits) that,
because of their unauthored or unfixed natures, respectively, fall
outside of the subject matter of copyright. 135 By contrast, the actual
voices or performances used in the Brown and Storball cases were fixed
in a tangible medium and therefore already within the scope of
copyright. But such a consideration makes more sense for an analysis
of a state-based right (like the right of publicity), which is subject to
express federal pre-emption defenses.136 And while recognition of such
performer rights raises legitimate concerns about interfering with the
flow of commerce and the licensing of copyrighted works, the same
concerns are present when dealing with unauthorized imitations of a
"mark" as opposed to unauthorized uses of the actual "mark."
Indeed, courts have (rightfully) bristled at recognizing such
protection for "performance rights" under the Lanham Act because such
an overture would necessarily interfere with the functioning of the
market for copyrighted works and burden-if not actively
undermine-the federal copyright regime as a whole. As the Second
Circuit noted in the Oliveira case involving "The Girl from Ipanema," if
courts acknowledged such a right,
Numerous artists who could assert claims similar to Gilberto's would bring suit against
entities that had paid bona fide license fees to all known holders of rights. Indeed, artists
who had licensed users under their copyrights and had received fees for the copyright
that "when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated
in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a
tort in California," and finding that "[a] singer manifests herself in the song[ and to] impersonate
her voice is to pirate her identity"); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1111 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that at trial the jury listened to recordings, heard evidence relevant to the likelihood of
confusion and evidence of actual consumer confusion and "[tihis evidence was sufficient to support
the jury's finding that consumers were likely to be misled by the commercial into believing that
Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos").
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (limiting copyright protection to "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
136. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); see also Ahn v. Midway Mfg., Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134, 1137
(N.D. Ill. 1997); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649-50 (Ct. App. 1996).
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license could bring suits claiming additional compensation for infringement of trademark
rights. Immense unforeseen liabilities might accrue, upsetting reasonable commercial
expectations. 
1 3 7
The Henley court adopted the same logic, claiming that a
contrary ruling, which necessarily would create a new species of
trademark rights, "would be profoundly disruptive to commerce.
'
"138
And the Sinatra court bristled at the plaintiffs unfair competition claim
because, among other things, the defendants "had paid a very
substantial sum to the copyright proprietor to obtain the license for the
use of the song and all of its arrangements."139 The wariness to grant
Lanham Act or related state common law relief to vindicate
performance rights makes eminent sense, and yet, many courts have
failed to even address this issue. For example, such a concern did not
alarm the courts in the Bette Midler and George Wendt disputes. After
all, in the former case, Ford and its advertising agency, Young &
Rubicam, had secured the rights to use Bette Midler's "Do You Want to
Dance?" from the musical composition's copyright holder for use in their
"Yuppie Campaign" for Lincoln Mercury.1 40 And in the latter case, Host
International had secured the rights to use Cheers's intellectual
property for its airport restaurants.
141
To be fair, the recognition of any "new" intellectual property
right always upsets commercial expectations and creates a new layer of
licensing requirements that did not previously exist. This undoubtedly
occurred, to take a few examples, when courts began to recognize the
derivative-rights doctrine,142 expanded copyright protection to extend to
non-literal elements of works, 143 or effectively created the right of
publicity from privacy law through the latter part of the twentieth
century. 14 4 Each of these innovations (or abominable forms of rights
137. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2001).
138. Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Oliveira, 251
F.3d at 63).
139. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir.1970).
140. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Young & Rubicam had
a license from the copyright holder to use the song. At issue in this case is only the protection of
Midler's voice.").
141. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.1997).
142. See Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552) (extending
copyright protection to derivative works, a position that was later codified by statute).
143. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that
copyright "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations").
144. The right of publicity, of course, emerged from the right of privacy famously discussed
by Warren and Brandeis. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Jeff
Sanders, By Force of Persona: How the Right of Publicity Undermines the First Amendment, 28
BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 13 (1994). By the middle of the twentieth century, the right of publicity
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accretion, 145 depending on your perspective) triggered claims by new
rights holders for additional compensation for existing practices. Yet
there is good reason to think that extension of protection for
performance rights under the Lanham Act and related state law would
have a particularly pernicious effect. Consider the tumultuous result
such protection might have on the PRO regime, which, despite all of its
problems, solves a huge economies-of-scale issue and manages to
provide songwriters around the world with regular royalty payments.
The functioning of the PRO regime, which accumulates millions of
micropayments, depends on the elimination of transaction costs
through the grant of blanket licenses for the public performance of
musical compositions.
If trademark liability could follow public performance of
copyrighted works, the delicate balance of the PRO regime could suffer.
In such a world, one might legitimately wonder whether The Red Hot
Chili Peppers, famously die-hard Lakers fans, might have a colorable
false endorsement claim any time their basketball arch-nemesis, the
Boston Celtics, played "Give It Away" at their home games. If such
actions could give rise to liability under the Lanham Act, the TD Garden
and the Boston Celtics could face liability for playing the song even
though they possess the appropriate public performance license to do
so. John (Cougar) Mellencamp-an all-American car kind of guy (and
Chevy pitchman to boot) 146-might have claims against the airing of his
songs as background music at Toyota corporation headquarters or at
any arena named after a foreign motor company, such as the Honda
Center in Anaheim, the Mercedes-Benz Superdome in New Orleans, or
the Toyota Center in Houston. Or Metallica may take legal action if
someone (other than Mariano Rivera, who apparently had the band's
blessing)147 comes out to close a ballgame (in a licensed stadium) to the
menacing rhythms of "Enter Sandman." Suddenly, anyone with a BMI
began to represent a distinct tort in its own right. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (recognizing, for the first time, the "right of publicity" as an
independent and distinct tort). But see Strickler v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 167 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Cal.
1958) (holding that "[tihis court does not feel it wishes to blaze the trail to establish in California
a cause of action based upon the right of publicity").
145. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 885-86 (2007); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 139, 153 (2009).
146. See David Carr, American Tragedies, to Sell Trucks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/business/media/30carr.html; Alan Light, Changes in
Mellencamp Country, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/arts/music/
22mell.html?_r=0.
147. See RJ Cubarrubia, Metallica Play 'Enter Sandman' for Mariano Rivera, ROLLING
STONE (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/videos/metallica-play-enter-
sandman-for-mariano-rivera-20130923. From 1999 until retirement, Yankees great Rivera
entered games in the ninth inning to the tune blasting through Yankee Stadium. Id.
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or ASCAP license could face liability for false endorsement when
playing songs. The unleashing of such a slippery slope of liability would
call into question the entire value of the public performance license and
potentially undermine the PRO regime as a whole.
Furthermore, although the extension of rights always threatens
to disrupt commercial expectations and the flow of commerce, the
implications are particularly serious if courts were to allow the
vindication of performer rights through the Lanham Act. Specifically,
the extension of trademark protection to certain aspects of performance
such as voice raises serious Dastar-like concerns. 148 In Dastar, the
Supreme Court rejected an attempted by Fox to use a Lanham Act claim
for false designation of origin as a means of preventing Dastar's
reproduction of an audiovisual work (to which Fox had previously
owned the copyright) that had fallen into the public domain. 149 In so
holding, the Court warned against the risk of creating a "species of
mutant" intellectual property protection that would impede the public's
right to make unfettered use of creative works that no longer enjoy
copyright protection. 
150
The recognition of performer rights through the Lanham Act is
equally problematic. Both according to statute and under the
Constitution's Copyright Clause, creative works such as sound
recordings must eventually fall into the public domain. 151 When they
do, threats of trademark liability could severely diminish the use of
formerly-copyrighted sound recordings if courts recognize a trademark
right in the performer's voice or other aspects of a performance. Thus,
precedent that establishes the availability of such relief under the
Lanham Act could create serious impediments to legitimate rights of
public access to creative works whose copyright terms have expired.
Long before Dastar, Judge Learned Hand recognized this problem.15 2
In a 1955 dissent in a suit between Capitol and Mercury records, 153 he
cautioned against the use of unfair-competition law to grant copyright-
like protection that would "grant to an author a perpetual monopoly"
over works in a way that would circumvent their eventual and proper
148. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
149. Id. at 23.
150. Id. at 34.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." (emphasis added)) ; 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
152. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664-68 (2d Cir.
1955) (Hand, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
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dedication to the public domain. 54 Thus, it is not just reasonable
investment-backed expectations and commerce that suffer but also
rights of public access to creative works and the exercise of First
Amendment rights based thereon.
Indeed, courts have increasingly recognized the profound speech
interests implicated in the unauthorized exploitation of others'
trademarks, 155 as the use of marks can play an important role in the
formation and expression of personhood, the sharing of social bonds,
and the dissemination of culturally coded communications. 156 Consider
Samsung's satirical 1990 advertisement about an evolving future (2012
A.D.) in which everything-except its own product-will have
changed. 157 It makes eminent creative sense that the advertiser would
reference Vanna White, the hostess of one of the most popular game
shows of the era, as she had taken on Barbie-like symbolism,158
epitomizing the beloved, quintessential all-American female. 159 Thus,
the use of the Vanna "persona" helped convey-both efficiently and
humorously-the idea that Samsung would still be around in the
future, despite everything else changing.1 60 After all, even the adored
all-American beauty had been replaced with a blonde-wigged, gowned,
and bejeweled robot turning letters.161 The use of a robotized symbol
recognizable to most Americans, such as the Vanna "persona," was an
important part of the success of the communication (and the
advertisement).1 6
2
While the White court failed to appreciate these interests
weighing in favor of Samsung, a famous dissent by Judge Kozinski from
154. Id. at 666-67; see also Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th
Cir. 1970) (noting Hand's concern over "allow[ing] unfair competition protection where Congress
has not given federal protection is in effect granting state copyright benefits without the federal
limitations of time to permit definite public domain use").
155. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 39, at 6 (2013).
156. See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and Social Identity, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 931, 941-
42 (2010); John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity
Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 28-29, 83 (2011).
157. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
158. Not coincidentally, in the early 1990's, White had released her own line of Barbie-like
dolls. See Short Takes: Look-Alike Vanna White Doll, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 1990),
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-31/entertainment/ca-3485 1 vanna-white; $Vanna White
1990 Limited Edition Home Shopping Club Doll, ZIMBIO (Apr. 3, 2013),http://www.zimbio.com/
Vanna+white/articles/qjlnHuIN-jT/Vanna+white+990+Limited+Edition+Home+Shopping.
159. A popular song of the time, Vanna, Pick Me a Letter, was an unabashed ode to her.
Patrick Goldstein, Calendar Desk, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1987, at 65 (characterizing Vanna, Pick
me a Letter as a "big novelty hit" by Dr. David Kolin).
160. See White, 989 F.2d at 1514.
161. See id.
162. See id. Indeed, making the association to Vanna White, in her capacity as Wheel of
Fortune hostess, constituted a part of the speech itself. See id.
[Vol. 16:1:11
2013] G UANTANAMO'S GREATEST HITS
the Ninth Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc brought attention to
the First Amendment issues given short shrift by the holding.
1 63 Just
a decade later, in a suit involving references to the real Barbie in the
song "Barbie Girl" by the Danish band, Aqua, Kozinski led the Ninth
Circuit to formal adoption of a defense that recognized the important
expressive interests at play in the unauthorized use of others'
trademarks.164
That defense, based on the Second Circuit's Rogers v. Grimaldi
case, 165 has served as a powerful First Amendment limitation on the
exertion of trademark rights in recent years. 166 Under the test, so long
as a trademark utilized in a creative endeavor has artistic
relevance-in the words of the Ninth Circuit, "the level of relevance
163. Id. at 1513 (denouncing the decision as "a classic case of overprotection. Concerned
about what it sees as a wrong done to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a property right of
remarkable and dangerous breadth.... This Orwellian notion withdraws far more from the public
domain than prudence and common sense allow .... It raises serious First Amendment problems.
It's bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second look.").
164. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002). Not all courts
have applied the Rogers test to recent false endorsement claims brought by performers; but many
of those courts have conducted their own independent balancing of the First Amendment with
trademark rights. For example, when Lady Miss Kier of the band Deee-Lite sued Sega under the
Lanham Act for featuring a character, Ulala, that bore all too much of a resemblance to her and
her retro-disco-funk performance 'persona,' a trial court and state appellate court rejected the
claim (among others) on free speech grounds. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607,
608-09 (Ct. App. 2006). The court admitted that there were significant similarities between Ulala
and Kier's persona and, to make matters worse for the defendant, that Sega had originally sought
Kier's endorsement, thereby indicating their intention to base the character on her. See id. at 610,
613. But the court nevertheless concluded that "given the many dissimilarities between the Ulala
character and Kirby, any public confusion arising from a mistaken assumption is easily
outweighed by the public interest in free artistic expression, so as to preclude application of
the Lanham Act." Id. at 618.
165. 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). For an in-depth discussion of the background to
Rogers v. Grimaldi and the origins of the defense, see Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, From
Debbie Does Dallas to The Hangover: The Changing Landscape of Trademark Law in Tinseltown,
in HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW (Paul McDonald, Eric Hoyt, Emily Carman, and Philip Drake eds.,
forthcoming 2014).
166. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 39, at 51 ('The Rogers test represents a
significant prospeech innovation in trademark law, permitting both uses that may confuse
consumers and uses for which alternative mechanisms are available for making a similar
expressive point."). While Rogers initially applied to the use of trademarks in titles to creative
works, it has expanded to uses of trademarks within creative works as well. See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm't
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Although [the Rogers]
test traditionally applies to uses of a trademark in the title of an artistic work, there is no
principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use of a trademark in the body of the work.");
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936-37 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a defendant's
use of Tiger Woods's likeness in a painting entitled Masters of Augusta was entitled to First
Amendment protections under the Rogers test); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g
Grp., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that "the Rogers balancing approach is generally
applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression, a category that includes
parody").
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merely must be above zero"167-the use cannot be infringing unless it
"explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work." 168 In
other words, absent "particularly compelling" evidence of a likelihood of
confusion, 169 there is no infringement. The Rogers test did not come to
life and gain widespread acceptance until after such cases as White,
Waits, and Wendt.170 But it would appear, at first blush, to provide a
potent defense against Lanham Act claims grounded in performer
rights. After all, campaign commercials and product advertisements
certainly have strong expressive and creative components and,
therefore, qualify as forms of speech.
Some courts, however, have deemed commercial speech-no
matter how steeped in artistic expression-ineligible for the Rogers
defense. A recent decision, Facenda v. N.F.L. Films,17' is illustrative in
that it expressly denied a Rogers defense for the National Football
League (NFL) when it used, without authorization, the voice of
legendary sports announcer John Facenda in its twenty-two minute
film The Making of Madden NFL 06.172 Facenda is the legendary 'Voice
of God" from NFL Films fame.173 Shortly before his death, Facenda had
provided the NFL with a broad release allowing them to exploit his
audio recordings in any way, so long as the use did not "constitute an
endorsement of any product or service."'174 Facenda's estate raised a
trademark claim for false endorsement, contending that fans hearing
his voice on the film would assume that he had lent his approval to the
film and the videogame it was describing, John Madden Football.175
The NFL maintained that its periodic use of Facenda's voice
represented an artistic choice for a documentary film, not an effort to
confuse consumers as to endorsement or sponsorship. 176 The court
rejected this argument, explaining that the NFL's "economic
motivation" rendered the film commercial speech. 177 Because no one in
the film had anything negative to say about the videogame-in the style
of a hagiography, it served as an unabashed celebration of the work and
its making-the court did not believe the film had a "documentary
167. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d at 1099.
168. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
169. See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664-65 (5th
Cir. 2000); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993).
170. Rogers itself was only decided in 1989. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 994.
171. 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1011-12.
174. Id. at 1022 (quoting release language).
175. See id. at 1024-25.
176. Id. at 1016.
177. Id. at 1017-18.
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purpose." 178 In the end, therefore, the court concluded the documentary
only served as an advertisement for the Madden videogame. 179 The
court consequently deemed the use commercial due to its
fundamentally promotional purpose and held that the NFL could not
take advantage of the Rogers defense.
180
Yet patrolling a line between commercial and noncommercial
forms of artistic expression is problematic. As Judge Kozinski
noted: "In our pop culture, where salesmanship must be entertaining
and entertainment must sell, the line between the commercial and
noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has disappeared."1 8 1 And
the implications of the holdings in such advertisement or
commercial-related exploitation cases as Midler, Waits, and Wendt are
troubling for free speech. As Jennifer Rothman has argued, the Midler
and Waits decisions have the potential to stifle a wide range of musical
expression. Under the holding of Midler, "Celine Dion could be barred
from performing or recording 'Memories,' a song made famous by
Barbra Streisand, because Dion's voice is similar enough to Streisand's
that her rendition might be deemed a 'sound-alike. '"'1 82 This is
particularly problematic because the compulsory mechanical license
available under section 114 of the Copyright Act expressly gives Dion
(or anyone else) the right to do a cover version of "Memories" or any
other published musical composition.18 3 Meanwhile, "[u]nder the logic
of Waits, Billie Holiday's estate could sue pop singer Macy Gray, who
has a similar vocal lilt and style to Holiday, even if Gray did not sing
any songs made famous by Holiday."18 4 And under the reasoning from
Wendt, show creators (and copyright holders) may risk liability if they
replace actors on programs with ones with similar physical
characteristics.18 5 All of these liability fears stifle creative freedoms and
limit the scope of acceptable expressive activities.
178. Id. at 1018.
179. Id. at 1017.
180. Id. at 1017-18; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10
Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 WL 1022247, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (failing to even consider a
Rogers defense in granting summary judgment to Louis Vuitton on claims of trademark dilution
for Hyundai's one-second shot of a basketball with a pattern suggestive of Louis Vuitton's
monogram in a Super Bowl advertisement); Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1236-
JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (describing Rogers test as
interrogating "intentional use of another's intellectual property for commercial profit").
181. But see White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).
184. Rothman, supra note 35, at 221 (footnote omitted).
185. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (warning that, under the logic of the Wendt decision,
individuals such as Wayne Knight, the actor who played Newman in the comedy Seinfeld, might
2013]
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
Given the significant complications weighing against the grant
of Lanham Act relief to performers, one can certainly wonder why
courts have occasionally gone down the primrose path to liability at
plaintiffs' behests. Without getting too dramatic, as the old saw goes,
the road to hell is paved with good intentions; or to quote an ancient
legal maxim: hard facts frequently make bad law.18 6 Many of these
cases include sympathetic plaintiffs who are otherwise not entitled to
any compensation for the use of an intangible thing to which they have
given value, often through a lifetime of hard work. In particular, the
performance rights cases recognizing Lanham Act and related state law
violations may be driven by the inequities of the extant copyright
regime, which has historically failed to provide performers (and
sound-recording copyright holders) any kind of remuneration for the
non-digital public performance of their works18 7 and, more generally,
has historically denied pure performers any sort of copyright interests
in creative works.
188
Consider the Midler case, for example.18 9 In that case, there was
an inescapable sense that the defendants have illicitly usurped at least
something of value from the performer. To make matters worse, just
about everyone except the performer appeared to be making money from
the subject matter of the suit. Indeed, the optics of the case were not
favorable to the defendants, who had initially wanted Midler to record
the song for them for use in the advertisement at issue. 190 When she
refused, on the grounds that she never did commercials, they instead
hired a Midler imitator (and former Midler backup singer, to add insult
to injury).191 So Ford and Young & Rubicam enjoyed a profitable
advertising campaign that succeeded in no small part because of the
associational value that Midler had given to the spot's soundtrack,
Midler's backup singer received a nice pay day, and the composers of
have a claim against the show creators if they created a spin-off program named Kramer and cast
another portly man to assume the Newman role).
186. Judge Rolfe is typically cited as the first jurist to memorialize this principle. He did
so in Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402; 10 M. & W. 109, when he observed that
"[t]his is one of those unfortunate cases in which... no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be
without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not be influenced. Hard cases, it has been
frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law." Id. at 405-06.
187. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
§ 106(6), 109 Stat. 336, 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012)) (amending the Act
to include a public performance right for digital transmissions of sound recordings); 17 U.S.C. §
114(g)(2)(B) (2012) (splitting receipts between record labels and featured and non-featured
performers).
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting exclusive rights under the Copyright Act to the
copyright holder); see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
189. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
190. See id. at 461.
191. See id.
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"Do You Want to Dance?" garnered a rich license. 192 Though the lower
court provocatively equated the conduct of the defendants with that of
"the average thief," it nevertheless granted summary judgment to the
defendants because no legal theory appeared to provide relief for
Midler. 193 The Ninth Circuit felt the same way about the defendants'
actions, reversed the district court, and revived the suit by recognizing
a new theory for relief: "[W]hen a distinctive voice of a professional
singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have
committed a tort."194 The case went to trial and a jury awarded Midler
$400,000 in damages, a verdict ultimately affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit. 95 In some ways, the Waits case was even worse. 196 There, Tom
Waits did not even enjoy Midler's opportunity to turn down the
advertisers for the use of his actual voice.
1 97
These two cases appear compelling at first blush. The sense of
injury is eminently relatable to most artists who have seen their works
usurped for a purpose that is fundamentally at odds with their most
passionate beliefs. Yet it is worth remembering that, in both cases, the
advertisers would have preferred to use and pay the artists that
eventually sued them in the first place; it was only because Midler and
Waits had no interest in ever appearing in commercials that the
advertisers went in a different direction.1 98 Moreover, if we provide
relief against voice imitators in such cases as Midler and Waits, one can
reasonably ask why we do not provide relief to the individuals whose
actual voices and performance persona are being used to hawk
products-for example, in the Astrud Gilberto and James Brown cases.
Any meritorious distinction is unlikely to come from a meaningfully
different analysis on the likelihood of confusion.
To wit, if an imitation is so good that it sounds like an original,
then the most skillful imitation can only become as injurious as the
original-never worse. If the imitation is not skillful, people will
recognize that it is not the actual performer, diminishing the likelihood
of confusion. If the imitation is incredibly skillful, then the imitation
192. See id. at 461-62.
193. Id. at 462.
194. Id. at 463 (cautioning that "[w]e need not and do not go so far as to hold that every
imitation of a voice to advertise merchandise is actionable," although the only limitation it
appeared to create on actionable vocal imitations was that the original voice be well known and
distinctive).
195. Midler v. Young & Rubicam Inc., 944 F.2d 909, 1991 WL 185170, at *1 (9th Cir. 1991)
(unpublished table decision).
196. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
197. Id. at 1098 (explaining that Frito-Lay did not even bother asking Waits because "you
never heard anybody say no so fast in your life").
198. See id. at 1098; Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
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and the original sound the same to the audience and use of the imitation
is just as injurious to the performer as use of the original would be. But
in no instance is use of the imitation more injurious to the performer
than use of the original.
There may be something else going on, however. Differences in
the circumstances leading to the use of an imitator may have motivated
courts to reach different decisions. In imitator cases, the defendants
appear to be taking away from performers something that the
performers have not explicitly or implicitly given away previously. In
other words, while Midler and Waits may have waived rights to their
performances as specifically embodied in certain sound recordings, they
never gave away their actual personae-the raw material imitated by
the specific advertisements at issue in the suits. Meanwhile, in cases
making use of the plaintiffs actual voice, the defendant is directly
exploiting something that the performers did, in fact, previously give
away. In the Oliveira and Brown cases, for example, the defendants
only made use of the exact persona as embodied in a recording to which
the two performers had waived or assigned their rights.
But there does not appear to be good reason to rest the case law
on such a distinction. In the Midler case, for example, the defendants
could have simply used the original version of "Do You Want to Dance?"
with Midler's vocals instead of recreating it with an imitation and,
under the logic of Oliveira, would not have faced liability. Furthermore,
the defendants had a license to use the sound recording for "Do You
Want to Dance?" to prepare a derivative version (i.e., the final
advertisement). 199 The lack of separate liability for derivative versions
of a work to the performer whose singing is embodied in the original
work, however, undermines the function of the licensing market for
copyrighted works. In Waits, the actual song used in the advertisement
was one that had never been associated with or performed by Tom
Waits.200 In fact, it was an original composition written for the spot
itself.20 1 As such, in the words of Jennifer Rothman, the court's holding
effectively gave Waits "ownership of a masculine raspy singing style."
20 2
As David Lange warned more than thirty years ago, each
concession to a new intellectual property right ineluctably diminishes
199. See Midler, 1991 WL 185170, at *2 (noting that the defendant had the right to use
the sound recording).
200. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098.
201. See id. at 1101. Admittedly, however, the song was "inspired by" and tried to "capture
the feeling of' Tom Waits's song "Step Right Up." Id. at 1097. Notably, however, copyright
infringement was not at issue in the case. See id. at 1100.
202. Rothman, supra note 35, at 221.
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the public domain. 20 3 Granting additional protections to performers is
therefore not without heavy costs. The privatization and propertization
of performance tropes takes something away from all of us, including
other performers.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHITHER PERFORMER RIGHTS?
Benjamin Kaplan once observed that "[n]umerous bills intended
to secure a performer's copyright have been introduced in Congress only
to be aborted there, and courts are left to deal with the subject as a kind
of stray of common-law copyright and 'unfair competition.' 20 4 Although
Kaplan wrote these words more than half a century ago, not much
appears to have changed. 205 Performers continue to enjoy little in the
way of express statutory protections and courts have cobbled together
occasional relief under a variety of intellectual property theories
extending beyond statutory copyright. As sympathetic as a performer's
claims may be, the consequences of establishing liability under the
Lanham Act through theories of false endorsement are dangerous and
should give future courts great pause.
Three strong caveats bear mentioning, however. First, as
discussed in Part I, the foregoing analysis is strictly limited to the use
of the Lanham Act and related state law to vindicate performer rights.
Litigants in such cases frequently raise alternate theories of liability,
including those grounded in the right of publicity. Although there may
be good reasons to scrutinize such claims as well, that issue is beyond
the scope of this Article and has received much more extensive
treatment in the existing literature on performer rights. Second, the
foregoing analysis does not mean to preclude the availability of
performer rights in all circumstances under the Lanham Act and
related state law. There may be extremely limited circumstances where
the extension of such protection might make sense. As this Article
shows, however, there are myriad problems with such a narrow tack,
meaning that courts should be extremely reluctant to carve out
exceptions without stringent constraints on their scope.
203. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 147,
150 (1981) ("[R]ecognition of new intellectual property interests should be offset today by equally
deliberate recognition of individual rights in the public domain .... Each [intellectual property]
right ought to be marked off clearly against the public domain.").
204. Benjamin Kaplan, Performer's Rights and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69
HARV. L. REV. 409, 409-10 (1956).
205. See Joshua P. Binder, Current Developments of Public Performance Rights for Sound
Recordings Transmitted Online: You Push Play, But Who Gets Paid?, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1,
6 (2001). But see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2012) (amending the Copyright Act to start providing
federal protection for sound recordings, even though these rights are largely held by record
companies).
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, one should not read this
less-than-sanguine evaluation to suggest that performer rights are, in
general, unworthy of consideration. There are sound reasons for
providing greater recognition of and protection for the contributions
that performers make to the commercial and artistic value of creative
works. And measures to support this goal could take a number of
different forms. Adoption of the long-sought application of public
performance rights on sound recordings to include non-digital
transmissions is one proposal to consider. 20 6 More creatively, we might
look at granting performers, like authors, a statutory regime of
termination/reversion rights, akin to the Copyright Act's sections 203
and 304(c) & (d), so that artists can get back the publicity rights imbued
in their performances thirty-five years after a transfer. Or, courts
might rethink their notions of authorship, thereby enabling certain
performers to make claims as copyright holders in particular instances.
Whatever the form such expanded performer rights might take,
granting protection under the Lanham Act and related state law is not
among the advisable options.
Still, there is no doubt that courts will continue to face the
temptation to do just that. The 2016 Presidential campaign is around
the corner, and it promises more intellectual property fireworks. Given
Chris Christie's increasingly likely run for the Republican nomination
and his (admitted) obsession with all things Bruce Springsteen 207-- a
man who does not remotely share his political sensibilities208 -one
likely source of the conflagrations seems easy enough to predict. So
when Christie inevitably makes use of his favorite gems from the
Springsteen oeuvre, infringement salvos may fire once again. Astrud
Gilberto, Don Henley, Bette Midler, and Tom Waits can all sympathize
with Springsteen's likely dilemma. Whether a court should provide
relief if called upon to do so is-quite rightfully-an entirely different
question.
206. See Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue?: An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a
General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 181, 189
(2004).
207. See Jeffrey Goldberg, Jersey Boys, ATLANTIC (June 13, 2012, 10:15 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/ersey-boys/309019; see also Beth DeFalco,
Superfan Christie Knows Who's Boss, N.Y. POST (Nov. 2, 2012, 5:00 AM),
http://nypost.com/2012/11/06/superfan-christie-knows-whos-boss.
208. Matt Katz, Christie Makes a Friend Named Bruce Springsteen, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 5,
2012, 8:58 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/christie-chronicles/Christie-makes-a-friend-
named-Bruce-Springsteen.html.
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